Marinakis proposal wins unanimous Super League approval as clubs reopen central TV-rights model


For years, the argument around television money in Greek football has usually started with the same question.
How should the money be divided?
Evangelos Marinakis wants the Super League to answer a different question first.
How much money should there be?
That distinction sits at the center of a potentially important development from Tuesday's meeting of Super League owners, where all 14 clubs unanimously approved the Olympiacos owner's proposal to commission an independent study into the possibility of restoring centralized television-rights management. No collective broadcasting deal has been signed. No revenue formula has been agreed. Olympiacos' existing television contract is not being rewritten but Greek football has taken a meaningful first step toward reconsidering how its most important recurring commercial asset is sold.
Two different ideas were effectively competing
Giannis Alafouzos proposed a model centered on dividing television revenue equally among the league's 14 clubs. Olympiacos, AEK and PAOK opposed that approach strongly enough that it never reached a vote.
Marinakis proposed something structurally different. Create a working group. Establish the parameters that need examining, then ask an independent specialist — with Deloitte identified for the work — to analyze the market and determine how centralized rights could increase the league's overall commercial revenue before designing an appropriate distribution mechanism. That proposal passed unanimously.
The distinction is important because it would be easy to describe Tuesday's debate as Olympiacos resisting revenue sharing. That isn't quite what happened. Olympiacos supported studying a return to centralized television rights.
What Marinakis rejected was the assumption that centralization must mean taking independently negotiated club revenues and dividing them equally.
Those are two very different economic models
Imagine the league's existing television value as a fixed pie. An equal-share proposal asks how many pieces to cut it into. Marinakis' proposal asks whether central negotiation can make the pie larger before anybody starts cutting. That is the much more important commercial question.
A centralized product potentially offers broadcasters something individual negotiations cannot: every Super League match, one coherent rights package, predictable inventory, league-wide sponsorship integration, centralized international distribution, and potentially better digital rights.
Whether that actually produces more money is precisely what the study is supposed to determine.
Olympiacos have more to protect than most clubs
This is where the club's position becomes understandable. Olympiacos possess the country's largest or one of its largest supporter bases, consistently generate substantial television interest and have significant European visibility.
Those characteristics give the club leverage when negotiating independently. An equal 1/14 distribution therefore creates an obvious question: Why should a club responsible for disproportionately large audience demand accept exactly the same television revenue as one producing substantially less?
Smaller clubs can make the opposite argument. A league only functions because there are opponents. Competitive balance increases the value of the championship. Stronger smaller clubs produce better matches, improve stadium environments and make the product more attractive. Both arguments contain economic logic.
The difficult part is designing a formula that recognizes both.
European football already provides several possible answers
Centralized television systems rarely distribute every euro identically. Models can include combinations of:
an equal base payment, historical performance, current league performance, broadcast appearances, audience measurements, commercial contribution, and solidarity mechanisms.
That allows a league to provide smaller clubs with predictable revenue without pretending every club creates identical commercial demand. The Deloitte study now gives the Super League an opportunity to model those trade-offs using actual market data rather than negotiating almost entirely through club politics.
Existing contracts are protected
This may be Tuesday's most important practical detail. All clubs agreed that their current television agreements remain in force. So Olympiacos are not suddenly surrendering existing broadcast revenue.
Neither are the other clubs.
The exercise concerns the architecture of a possible future system. That dramatically lowers the immediate stakes and makes compromise easier. Nobody has to abandon money already contracted. They are negotiating what the next market might look like.
There is potentially more money elsewhere too
Reporting around the meeting says another €10 million connected to betting revenue may potentially become available to the clubs, although how such money would be distributed remains unresolved. That reinforces the larger issue.
Greek football's commercial debate should not necessarily be a zero-sum fight between Olympiacos, Panathinaikos, AEK, PAOK and the remaining clubs. Increasing total league revenue can matter more than winning a slightly larger percentage of a stagnant pool. Better television packaging. International rights.
Betting-related distributions. Central sponsorship. Digital content. Improved scheduling. Stronger production.
Those are all areas where a unified league product can potentially create value.
And Olympiacos actually benefit from stronger opponents
There is a football argument here as well as a financial one. Olympiacos need the Greek league to improve.
Domestic matches provide the weekly environment in which a team preparing for Marseille, Milan or other European opponents develops. If too many league games become economically and competitively unbalanced, Olympiacos suffer too. Better-funded opponents can recruit better players. Better players produce harder matches.
Harder matches create a better television product. A better product attracts more money. That money can then improve the clubs again. That is the virtuous cycle every domestic league wants. The challenge is building it without penalizing the clubs already responsible for generating much of the commercial demand.
That is why Tuesday matters
Nothing changed in Olympiacos' bank account. No television contract changed hands. No centralized Super League package exists yet. But something unusual did happen. All 14 clubs agreed on the process. In Greek football, that is not insignificant. The league will now attempt to replace an argument driven primarily by competing club interests with a study based on market evidence. Eventually the difficult conversation returns.
How much should Olympiacos receive? How much should Panathinaikos receive? How much should AEK and PAOK receive? How much should everyone else receive?
Marinakis has successfully moved another question ahead of all of them: How much could Greek football collectively be worth if it sold itself better?
For Olympiacos, that may ultimately be the question worth considerably more money.




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